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Introduction
IN ARRIVING AT THE DETERMINATION that the exclusionary rule
no longer applies to knock-and-announce violations,1 the Supreme
Court’s rationale in Hudson v. Michigan2 included the idea that factors
other than exclusion exist to prevent police misconduct concerning
the knock-and-announce rule.3 Particular examples of these alterna-
tive factors relied upon by the Court are improved training, educa-
tion, and internal discipline of police:
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1. The knock-and-announce rule usually requires police to knock and to give notice
to occupants of the officer’s presence and authority prior to entering a residence to make
an arrest or conduct a search. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012). If the police comply with the rule,
but the occupants refuse to grant admittance, the police may break into the residence by,
for example, destroying a door or window. Id. During a trial, the exclusionary rule gener-
ally prohibits the admission of evidence against a defendant if the police obtained the
evidence while violating the defendant’s constitutional rights (e.g., during an illegal search
or arrest). See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (directing the states to apply the
exclusionary rule).
2. 547 U.S. 586 (2005).
3. Id. at 597–99.
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Another development over the past half-century that deters civil-
rights violations [such as a knock-and-announce violation] is the
increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new em-
phasis on internal police discipline. . . . [W]e now have increasing
evidence that police forces across the United States take the consti-
tutional rights of citizens seriously. There have been “wide-ranging
reforms in the education, training, and supervision of police
officers.”4
For example, according to the Supreme Court in Hudson, if of-
ficers fail to adhere to constitutional norms such as the knock-and-
announce rule, they can be disciplined in a way that will impede them
from advancing in their occupation.5 Additionally, the Supreme Court
in Hudson noted that “various forms of citizen review” can prevent po-
lice misconduct concerning the knock-and-announce rule.6 In fact,
the majority of Justices in Hudson suggested that the growing presence
and power of the alternative deterrence factors (police training, edu-
cation, internal discipline, and citizen review mechanisms) since the
time of Mapp v. Ohio7 may mean that exclusion of evidence following
all Fourth Amendment errors by police may no longer be required
(though the majority refrained from adopting this approach as a mat-
ter of Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law—at least for the
time being).8
4. See id. at 598–99 (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990, at 51 (1993)). However, criminologist Samuel
Walker explained that Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Hudson, misquoted
him on the idea that police education, training, and supervision (e.g., discipline) can serve
as substitutes for exclusion as deterrents for constitutional misbehavior by police. See Sa-
muel Walker, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at M5 available at http://
articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/25/opinion/oe-walker25 (“[Justice Scalia] twisted my main
argument to reach a conclusion the exact opposite of what I spelled out in this and other
studies. . . . My argument, based on the historical evidence of the last 40 years, is that the
Warren court in the 1960s played a pivotal role in stimulating these reforms. For more
than 100 years, police departments had failed to curb misuse of authority by officers on the
street while the courts took a hands-off attitude. The Warren court’s interventions (Mapp
[concerning the application of the exclusionary rule in state courts to deter Fourth
Amendment violations by police] and Miranda being the most famous) set new standards
for lawful conduct, forcing the police to reform and strengthening community demands
for curbs on abuse.”) (italics added).
5. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599. For example, police may be suspended or dismissed from
their jobs, or they may receive a demotion in rank or decrease in pay. Id.
6. Id.
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (directing the states to apply the exclusionary rule).
8. Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Hudson, stated:
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply
because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and long
ago. That would be forcing the public to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a
legal regime that existed almost half a century ago.
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Moreover, though in Hudson the relevant knock-and-announce vi-
olation occurred during a police search at premises, lower federal and
state courts since Hudson have applied its ruling to knock-and-an-
nounce violations by police in the arrest context.9 Thus, these courts
have effectively determined that the exclusion of evidence in court is
no longer warranted following police knock-and-announce violations
during arrests of suspects at premises.10
The basis of this Article is a study consisting of a detailed survey
of police chiefs in large Unites States cities. Given both the Hudson
decision’s rationale and implications and the subsequent application
of Hudson by the lower courts, the objectives of this study are three-
fold: (1) to examine the chiefs’ knowledge concerning the knock-and-
announce rule in the context of police arrests at premises; (2) to eval-
uate how the chiefs perceive officer training concerning knock-and-
announce procedures in the context of police arrests at premises; and
(3) to analyze how the chiefs perceive the value of exclusion versus
the various, alternative factors to prevent police misconduct during
arrests at premises implicating the knock-and-announce rule, includ-
ing the factors of police training, education, internal discipline, and
citizen review mechanisms.
This is the first significant study since Orfield’s studies of the late
1980s11 and Perrin’s work of the 1990s12 to empirically evaluate the
Id. at 597. Justice Scalia posited that today, as compared to the 1960s when Mapp was de-
cided, there are alternative deterrents to police misconduct in the search and seizure area,
such as civil lawsuits, internal police discipline/supervision, training, and education, which
have the potential to effectively replace exclusion. Id. at 597–99. Three other Justices
seemed to agree with Scalia’s reasoning in this regard; however, Justice Kennedy, who
joined the majority decision, drafted a separate concurring opinion in which he com-
mented that “the continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by
our precedents, is not in doubt.” See id. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. See United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194 (1st Cir. 2006); State v. Marcum, No.
04-CO-66, 2006 WL 3849861 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006).
10. See Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194; Marcum, 2006 WL 3849861.
11. For a lengthier explanation of the studies by Orfield and Perrin on the exclusion-
ary rule, see infra Part I.D. Orfield, in his two studies in the late 1980s and 1990s, concen-
trated mostly on the alternative deterrent factor of civil lawsuits. See Myron Orfield, Jr., The
Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1016, 1017–18 (1987) [hereinafter Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence]; see
Myron Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago
Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 83 (1992) [hereinafter Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury,
and the Heater Factor]. The study discussed in this Article will evaluate alternative deterrent
factors, aside from the exclusion of evidence, for police misconduct during arrests that
implicate the knock-and-announce rule. These factors include internal police discipline,
police education and training, and community oversight, such as citizen review boards. In
addition, the respondents in Orfield’s study included police officers and detectives, while
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efficacy of alternative factors to exclusion for police misconduct in the
Fourth Amendment arrest area, and this is the first known empirical
study to assess the value of various alternatives to exclusion in the
knock-and-announce arrest area in light of Hudson’s emphasis on
these alternatives.13 No other known study has examined police chief
knowledge of the knock-and-announce rule in the arrest context or
police chief perception of officer training in this context. Addition-
ally, in contrast to the earlier studies that focused more on patrol of-
ficers and investigators, this study examines police chiefs. Finally, this
study covers all cities throughout the United States consisting of more
than 100,000 residents. This geographical coverage is more expansive
than previous studies.14
the respondents in this Article’s study are police chiefs. See Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule
and Deterrence, supra , at 1024–25.
12. Apart from Orfield’s work, the study by Perrin in the late 1990s is the only other
significant scholarly work evaluating alternative deterrent factors to exclusion for police
misconduct in the search and seizure area. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It:
Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 701 (1998). Perrin’s study concen-
trated mostly on police officers’ perceptions of the various deterrents (and, to a lesser
extent, the perception of detectives and other ranking officers), while the study in this
Article concentrates on the perceptions of police chiefs. See id. at 719 (“Close to half of
those participating in the study held the rank of officer at the time they responded to the
questionnaire, about one-fifth held the rank of detective, and the remainder, about one-
third, held a rank above detective.”).
13. Though the Supreme Court has referred to the results of empirical studies on the
exclusionary rule in several decisions, it has exhibited less confidence toward the findings
of these studies, generally affording them only cursory treatment. See United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 453 (1976) (“‘Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabi-
tants of states which follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and
seizures than do those of states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained. Since as a prac-
tical matter, it is never easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual
data could ever be assembled.’”) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218
(1960)); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492, n.32 (1976); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at
What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study
and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 619 (1983) (noting that
the “inadequacies of research design and the measurement problems” lead to the conclu-
sion that “it is quite unlikely that there will be any rigorous measurement of the rule’s
specific deterrent effect in terms of how often illegal searches have been prevented”). For
the cursory treatment afforded scholarly studies of the exclusionary rule by the Court, see
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598–99 (asserting, without any supporting data, that “[t]here is also
evidence that increasing use of various forms of citizen review can enhance police account-
ability”). Hudson’s choice and reliance on earlier studies to support the idea that police
today are better disciplined, trained, and educated is weak at best. See id. For a lower
court’s interpretation of Hudson, see infra Part I.C.
14. This study also includes greater geographical diversity and scope than the earlier
studies by Perrin and Orfield, which were generally restricted to either one city or county.
See Perrin, supra note 12, at 712–13 (study participants mostly from Ventura County, Cali- R
fornia); Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1024–25 (studying R
drug officers in Chicago).
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Part I of this Article explains the knock-and-announce rule, the
Supreme Court decision in Hudson v. Michigan, related Supreme
Court case law on the exclusionary rule, and lower court cases inter-
preting Hudson. Part I also includes an examination of other empirical
studies regarding the exclusionary rule.
Part II describes the research methods utilized in the current
study’s methodological approach, including information about the
sample and survey instrument. Part III discusses the study’s findings as
well as the conclusions that can be derived from those findings. Over-
all, the study finds that a majority of police chiefs are knowledgeable
about the knock-and-announce rule in the context of police arrests at
premises. In addition, the majority of chiefs perceive that officers re-
ceive enough training on the knock-and-announce rule in the arrest
context. Finally, the police chiefs perceive that training, education,
and internal discipline have a greater deterrent impact on police mis-
conduct related to this rule in the arrest context than exclusion of
evidence and community oversight (though a majority do perceive ex-
clusion as a “helpful” deterrent in this context).
Part IV explores the study’s numerous implications for judicial
and law enforcement policy.
I. Background
Part I begins by explaining the knock-and-announce rule and
Hudson v. Michigan, a landmark 2006 decision by the Supreme Court
regarding the exclusionary rule. It then describes related Supreme
Court exclusionary rule jurisprudence, in particular jurisprudence
suggesting that alternative factors can replace exclusion as a deterrent
to police search-and seizure-misconduct. Next, it explains relevant
lower court case law interpreting Hudson, including case law examin-
ing Hudson’s application in the police arrest context. Finally, it de-
scribes previous, related empirical studies on the exclusionary rule.
A. The Knock-and-Announce Rule and Hudson v. Michigan15
Despite the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the knock-and-an-
nounce rule into the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry and
the rule’s long-standing history within our Common Law, the rule may
15. This Article includes an excerpt from The Exclusionary Rule After Hudson v.
Michigan: Mourning the Death of the Knock and Announce Rule, which originally appeared in
Criminal Law Bulletin, Volume 46, Issue 5, with permission. © 2010 Thomson Reuters.
Part I.A has been substantially excerpted with additional edits for clarity and content.
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have recently suffered a fatal blow in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hudson v. Michigan. The rule requires police to give notice of their
presence and their authority before entering a dwelling.16 If the po-
lice comply with the rule but are subsequently refused admittance by
the dwelling’s occupants, they may break into the dwelling by, for ex-
ample, destroying a door or window.17
The origins of the knock-and-announce rule can be traced to a
1604 English court decision known as Semayne’s Case.18 In that case,
the English court required law enforcement officers to announce
their purpose before entering a dwelling.19 In the United States, the
knock-and-announce rule has been made part of both the country’s
statutory and case law. The first United States case to incorporate the
knock-and-announce rule into its decision was Read v. Case20 in 1822.21
In 1917, the United States Congress first codified the rule into what is
currently 18 U.S.C. § 3109.22 The rule states:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of
a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a
search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a per-
son aiding him in the execution of the warrant.23
In Miller v. United States,24 the Supreme Court determined that
this statute applied to arrests and searches both with and without war-
rants.25 The Court found that the police violated the knock-and-an-
nounce rule because they failed to announce their authority before
breaking the door to Miller’s apartment.26 Though the Supreme
Court interpreted the knock-and-announce rule in other decisions af-
ter Miller,27 not until the 1995 case of Wilson v. Arkansas28 did the
16. 8 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012).
17. Id.
18. Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.); 5 Co. Rep. 91 a.
19. Id. at 195; 91 b.
20. 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
21. See id.
22. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, Title XI, §§ 8-9, 40 Stat. 229.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3109.
24. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
25. Id. at 309.
26. Id. at 313–14.
27. See, e.g., Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968) (finding that a “breaking”
under 18 U.S.C. § 3109 occurred when police opened a closed, but unlocked, door without
first announcing their authority and presence).
28. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
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Court incorporate the rule into the reasonableness inquiry of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.29
Significantly, the Court in Wilson alluded to particular exigent cir-
cumstances when law enforcement officials do not need to comply
with the knock-and-announce rule.30 These circumstances may in-
clude the threat of harm to law enforcement officials or third parties,
the possible destruction of relevant evidence, or the potential escape
of the suspect(s).31 In Richards v. Wisconsin,32 the Court clarified these
exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule by indicating that police
must knock-and-announce unless they have a reasonable suspicion
that their action “would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit
the effective investigation of crime by, for example, allowing the de-
struction of evidence.”33 More recently, the Supreme Court has found
that the Fourth Amendment does not require a more heightened
standard than reasonable suspicion for the issuance of “no-knock”
warrants34 and that, under the same Amendment, a period of fifteen
to twenty seconds is a reasonable time for law enforcement officials to
wait after knocking and announcing but before breaking into a
home.35
In its June 2006 decision in Hudson, authored by Justice Scalia,
the Supreme Court significantly undercut the viability of the knock-
and-announce rule by specifically holding that exclusionary rule prin-
ciples do not apply to knock-and-announce violations.36 Furthermore,
the decision arguably portends the end of the exclusionary rule for
other Fourth Amendment violations.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Hudson began by acknowledg-
ing that Hudson involves a clear violation by police of the knock-and-
announce rule.37 The police in Hudson entered a home pursuant to a
29. Id. at 934.
30. Id. at 934–36.
31. Id.
32. 520 U.S. 385 (1995).
33. Id. at 394.
34. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 69–71 (1998). In dicta, however, the Court
stated that excessive property damage caused by police during a search may implicate the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Id. at 71.
35. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003) (ruling that the potential for dispo-
sal of drug evidence by occupants, under an overall totality of the circumstances analysis,
warranted a Fourth Amendment reasonableness finding). Note that the Court in Banks
recognized that the determination of reasonableness was a “close one.” Id. at 38.
36. 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
37. Id. at 590 (“From the trial level onward, Michigan has conceded that the entry was
a knock-and-announce violation.”).
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valid warrant authorizing a search for drugs and guns and discovered
both items of contraband.38 The police announced their presence
prior to entering and waited only “‘three to five seconds’ before turn-
ing the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson’s
home.”39 Hudson challenged the quick entry into his home as unrea-
sonable, and the state conceded from the start of the case that the
entry constituted a knock-and-announce violation.40 The Court held
that the exclusionary rule was not the proper remedy for this constitu-
tional error.41
Scalia began his analysis of why the exclusionary rule is not an
appropriate remedy in the knock-and-announce context by arguing
that insufficient causation exists between a violation of the knock-and-
announce rule and subsequently discovered evidence.42 The necessary
“but-for” causation was absent because “[w]hether that preliminary
misstep [of violating the knock-and-announce rule] had occurred or
not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained,
and would have discovered the [evidence] inside the house.”43
Another reason Justice Scalia offered in support of Hudson’s hold-
ing was that the societal interests protected by applying the knock-
and-announce rule are not served by applying the exclusionary rule.44
The exclusionary rule is generally applied because unless and until “a
valid warrant has issued, citizens are entitled to shield ‘their persons,
houses, papers, and effects’ from the government’s scrutiny. Exclu-
sion of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search vindicates that
entitlement.”45 But the purpose of the knock-and-announce rule does
“not include the shielding of potential evidence from the govern-
ment’s eyes.”46 Rather, it serves three purposes that Justice Scalia
found qualitatively different: (1) preventing harm to police and
others “because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in sup-
posed self-defense by the surprised resident”;47 (2) protecting prop-
erty from unnecessary damage by knock-and-announce rule gives
individuals “the opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the
38. Id. at 588.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 588, 590.
41. Id. at 590, 599.
42. Id. at 592.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 593.
45. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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destruction of property occasioned by a forcible entry”;48 and (3) pro-
tecting “those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by
a sudden entrance,” such as giving someone an opportunity to put on
clothing.49 Scalia reasoned that none of these three purposes would
have been served by excluding the evidence of the guns and drugs
found in Hudson.50
Scalia then applied the Court’s typical balancing test when decid-
ing whether to apply the exclusionary rule in any given context.51 He
determined that the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to
knock-and-announce violations outweighed the deterrence benefits.52
In addition to the usual “grave adverse consequence that exclusion of
relevant incriminating evidence always entails (viz., the risk of releas-
ing dangerous criminals into society),”53 Scalia identified two addi-
tional social costs associated with applying the exclusionary rule in the
knock-and-announce context.54 The first was that such a remedy
would generate constant litigation to determine whether the rule ap-
plied and, if so, whether it was violated.55 The second was a concern
that the application of the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce
violations could lead to unnecessary over-deterrence.56 This latter con-
cern arose because officers might wait longer than desired after
knocking and announcing both to ensure compliance with the knock-
and-announce rule and to avoid the exclusion of probative evidence.57
This, in turn, has the potential to produce “preventable violence
against officers in some cases, and the destruction of evidence in
many others.”58
In terms of the deterrence benefits from applying the exclusion-
ary rule to knock-and-announce violations, Scalia concluded that such
benefits would be minimal.59 The threat of civil lawsuits for violations
of the knock-and-announce rule, rather than the “[m]assive deter-
48. Id. at 594 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)).
49. Id.
50. Id. (“What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected, however, is one’s
interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a war-
rant. Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure
of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 599.
53. Id. at 595.
54. Id. at 595–96.
55. Id. at 595 (citing Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 523 U.S. 357, 366 (1998)).
56. Id. at 595–96.
57. Id. at 595.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 596.
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rence” of the exclusionary rule, should be a sufficient deterrent to
police misconduct.60 This is because “ignoring knock-and-announce
can realistically be expected to achieve absolutely nothing except the
prevention of destruction of evidence and the avoidance of life-threat-
ening resistance by occupants of the premises—dangers which, if
there is even ‘reasonable suspicion’ of their existence, suspend the
knock-and-announce requirement anyway.”61
Scalia’s remaining reasons for finding minimal benefits in apply-
ing the exclusionary rule are especially noteworthy. This is because
Scalia’s comments may portend an end to the Court’s use of the ex-
clusionary rule in other contexts outside the knock-and-announce
area.62 Scalia commented that:
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary deter-
rence simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in
different contexts and long ago. That would be forcing the public
to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed
almost half a century ago.63
According to Scalia, since 1961, when the Court first applied the
exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio to deter Fourth Amend-
ment violations by police, civil rights lawsuits for Fourth Amendment
violations have become both more available and more frequent.64 For
Scalia, these suits provide an effective, alternative remedy to the exclu-
sionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations such as knock-and-an-
nounce violations.
According to Scalia, another effective remedy against Fourth
Amendment violations that has developed since the days of Mapp v.
Ohio includes the “increasing professionalism of police forces, includ-
ing a new emphasis on internal police discipline.”65 Law enforcement
officials today, better trained and educated than they were in the
1960s, understand the permissible, constitutional boundaries for their
conduct under the Fourth Amendment.66 As an example of how in-
creased police discipline will deter Fourth Amendment violations,
Scalia mentioned that officers who do not comply with Fourth
60. Id. at 596–97.
61. Id. at 596.
62. The dissent recognized this possibility, as well: “The majority’s ‘substantial social
costs’ argument is an argument against the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary principle
itself.” Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 597.
64. Id. at 597–98.
65. Id. at 598.
66. Id. at 599. For Justice Scalia, “[f]ailure to teach and enforce constitutional require-
ments exposes municipalities to financial liability.” Id.
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Amendment principles will not advance in their careers.67 Lastly, the
decision in Hudson posited that “various forms of citizen review” may
prevent police from violating the knock-and-announce rule.68
Justice Kennedy wrote a short concurring opinion in which he
joined the majority in all but one section of the decision.69 Kennedy
stated, somewhat mysteriously, that the “Court’s decision should not
be interpreted as suggesting that violations of the [knock-and-an-
nounce] rule are trivial or beyond the law’s concern.”70 He also com-
mented that the majority opinion in Hudson should not be read as
casting doubt on the exclusionary rule in general.71 Kennedy’s opin-
ion reflected his belief that the Court’s holding is based principally on
a causation argument; that is, there is an insufficient causal link be-
tween knock-and-announce violations and subsequent discoveries of
evidence to justify exclusion.72 Finally, Justice Kennedy pointed out
that, had the record in Hudson reflected a widespread pattern of
knock-and-announce violations, the decision may have been
different.73
According to Justice Breyer in the dissent, precedent, logic, and
policy considerations all dictate the contrary result from that reached
by the majority in Hudson.74 In terms of clear logic supported by pre-
cedent, Breyer argued that since a violation of the knock-and-an-
nounce principle translates into a violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, evidence obtained after
an unannounced entry must be excluded because “‘the use of evi-
dence secured through an illegal search and seizure’ is ‘barred’ in
criminal trials.”75 Justice Breyer also clearly believed that not applying
the exclusionary rule in this context would undermine deterrence of
unlawful police conduct.76 Civil rights lawsuits would not provide an
adequate deterrent effect because damages in such lawsuits are nomi-
67. Id. at 598.
68. Id. at 599.
69. This final part of Justice Scalia’s opinion discusses three cases that he felt bol-
stered his conclusion that the exclusionary rule should not apply to knock-and-announce
violations. Id. at 599–602. Justice Kennedy did not join in this part of the opinion. Id. at 604
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy’s only stated reason for doing so was that the cases
mentioned in the last part of the majority opinion did not “have as much relevance . . . as
Justice Scalia appears to [have] conclude[d].” Id.
70. Id. at 602–03.
71. Id. at 603.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 604.
74. Id. at 608, 611, 614 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 608 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)).
76. Id. at 610–11.
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nal77 and civil immunities to effective suits frequently exist in this
area.78
Returning to precedent, Justice Breyer pointed out that the
knock-and-announce rule does not fit squarely into either of two cate-
gories of exceptions the Court had already created in the Fourth
Amendment / exclusionary rule context: “(1) where there is a specific
reason to believe that application of the rule would ‘not result in ap-
preciable deterrence’”;79 and “(2) where admissibility in proceedings
other than criminal trials was at issue.”80 Breyer found that there were
no special social costs associated with applying the exclusionary rule in
the knock-and-announce context.81
In response to the majority’s finding of attenuation from “but-
for” causation, Justice Breyer believed there was indeed a sufficient
causal link between the illegal entry and the discovered evidence.82
The majority opinion, by separating the illegal entry from the subse-
quent search, both “slice[d] the violation too finely” and miscon-
strued the inevitable discovery doctrine.83 With respect to the former
point, Breyer reasoned that without the unlawful conduct, the police
would not have been in the house and able to discover the probative
evidence of the guns and drugs.84 With respect to the latter point, he
reasoned that the inevitable discovery doctrine would not apply to the
facts in Hudson:
The doctrine does not treat as critical what hypothetically could have
happened had the police acted lawfully in the first place. Rather,
“independent” or “inevitable” discovery refers to discovery that did
occur or that would have occurred (1) despite (not simply in the
absence of) the unlawful behavior and (2) independently of that unlaw-
ful behavior. The government cannot, for example, avoid suppres-
sion of evidence seized without a warrant (or pursuant to a
defective warrant) simply by showing that it could have obtained a
valid warrant had it sought one. Instead, it must show that the same
evidence “inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.”85
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 611 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).
80. Id. at 612.
81. Of course, the dissent admitted that the costs normally associated with exclusion
would apply in the knock-and-announce context if the exclusionary rule were applied. Id.
at 614.
82. Id. at 615.
83. Id. at 615–16.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 616 (citations omitted) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).
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Since there had been no “independent chain of events that
would have inevitably led to the discovery and seizure of the evidence
despite, and independent of,” the knock-and-announce violation in
Hudson, Breyer concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine was
inapplicable to the case.86
Justice Breyer took issue with the majority’s public policy conclu-
sions and concluded that the majority had failed to recognize the ex-
tent of the privacy interests underlying the knock-and-announce
rule.87 For Breyer, the knock-and-announce rule does more than pro-
tect property from unnecessary damage or people from sudden star-
tle; it “protects the occupants’ privacy by assuring them that
government agents will not enter their home without complying with
those requirements (among others) that diminish the offensive na-
ture of any such intrusion.”88
Justice Breyer also pointed out that it is immaterial whether the
interests underlying the knock-and-announce rule are implicated by
excluding particular evidence.89 For example, the “Fourth Amend-
ment does not seek to protect contraband, yet we have required sup-
pression of contraband seized in an unlawful search.”90 Thus,
contraband can both be private and protected even when, as in Hud-
son, the items have little or nothing to do with the interests implicated
by a particular constitutional rule.91 Therefore, the analysis can pro-
ceed more simply: If a violation of knock-and-announce occurs, the
ensuing search is unlawful and the discovered evidence should be
excluded.92
Finally, Justice Breyer attempted to recast the majority’s argu-
ment that excluding evidence after knock-and-announce violations
would lead to otherwise preventable violence against officers and the
unnecessary destruction of evidence (“overdeterrence”).93 For exam-
ple, the majority believed that officers might be needlessly harmed
because they might wait too long after knocking and announcing, but
before forcibly entering a home, in order to ensure their compliance
with the rule and avoid the exclusion of evidence.94 Breyer recast this
86. Id. at 618.
87. Id. at 620.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 621.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 622–23.
94. Id. at 622.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\48-1\san103.txt unknown Seq: 14  3-JAN-14 14:43
84 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
argument by explaining that the majority was really attacking the
knock-and-announce rule itself, and not the exclusion principle.95 He
claimed that the knock-and-announce rule adequately takes into ac-
count the majority’s concerns by allowing officers to enter a dwelling
immediately and unannounced when they harbor a reasonable suspi-
cion that others may harm them or evidence will be destroyed.96 Ac-
cording to Breyer, officers can also avoid uncertainty in the
application of the exclusionary rule and the accompanying danger
that results from waiting longer than necessary to enter a dwelling by
obtaining a no-knock warrant from a magistrate or judge.97
B. Related Supreme Court Exclusionary Rule Case Law
The Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to federal
courts for search-and-seizure violations by police in its 1914 decision
in Weeks v. United States.98 It later applied the rule in 1961 to state
courts in the now well-known case of Mapp v. Ohio.99 In particular,
Mapp found that evidence seized following Fourth Amendment
search-and-seizure violations by police shall be excluded in state
courts in order to deter police from committing these violations.100 In
other contexts outside the knock-and-announce area, the Supreme
Court has relied upon the rationale that alternative deterrent factors
such as police training and internal discipline can replace exclusion
to deter police and other criminal justice professionals from illegal
conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. In particular, in Penn-
sylvania Board of Probation v. Scott,101 the Supreme Court held that evi-
dence found as a result of illegal searches and seizures by parole
officers in violation of the parolee’s Fourth Amendment rights should
not be suppressed at parole revocation hearings in light of these other
deterrent factors:
Although this [supervisory] relationship [between parole officer
and parolee] does not prevent parole officers from ever violating
the Fourth Amendment rights of their parolees, it does mean that
the harsh deterrent of exclusion is unwarranted, given such other
deterrents as departmental training and discipline and the threat
of [civil] damages actions.102
95. Id. at 622–23.
96. Id. at 623.
97. Id. at 624.
98. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
99. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states).
100. Id.
101. 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
102. Id. at 368–69.
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Moreover, in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,103 the Supreme Court, in part,
rejected the application of the exclusionary rule in the context of civil
deportation hearings to evidence unconstitutionally seized by immi-
gration officers because “[t]he INS also has in place a [disciplinary]
procedure for investigating and punishing immigration officers who
commit Fourth Amendment violations.”104
Finally, the Supreme Court believed that alternative deterrent
factors could play a prominent role in deterring police from commit-
ting constitutional misdeeds in other contexts. For example, in craft-
ing the inevitable discovery exception to the Fourth Amendment, one
of the main doctrinal exceptions to the exclusionary rule,105 the Court
stated that “[s]ignificant disincentives to obtaining evidence ille-
gally—including the possibility of departmental discipline and civil lia-
bility—also lessen the likelihood that [this] exception will promote
police misconduct.”106
C. Lower Court Case Law Interpreting Hudson
Although state and lower federal courts are required to abide by
the Hudson decision as a matter of federal constitutional law—and in
fact these courts have broadly interpreted Hudson—they have been
split on the issue of whether the alternative factors mentioned in Hud-
son are effective in deterring police search-and-seizure misconduct.
Significant to the study presented here, and as evidence of the broad
interpretation of Hudson, the First Circuit applied the Hudson rule to
police knock-and-announce violations during the execution of an ar-
rest warrant.107
At least one state court has agreed with the First Circuit concern-
ing this specific application of Hudson.108 Moreover, as evidence of the
expansive interpretation of Hudson, the Fifth Circuit extended the
Hudson holding of non-exclusion to evidence seized by police follow-
ing knock-and-announce violations under federal statutory law.109 In
103. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
104. Id. at 1045 (citing INS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND
SEIZURE FOR IMMIGRATION OFFICERS 35 (1983)).
105. JOHN N. FERDICO, HENRY F., FRADELLA & CHRISTOPHER D. TOTTEN, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 81–85 (11th ed. 2012).
106. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)).
107. United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 201 (1st Cir. 2006).
108. See State v. Marcum, No. 04-CO-66, 2006 WL 3849861 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28,
2006).
109. See United States v. Bruno, 487 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2007).
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addition, the Sixth Circuit has applied the Hudson holding to knock-
and-announce violations by police during warrantless entries.110 At
least one state court has followed the Sixth Circuit in this applica-
tion.111 Finally, other state courts have applied the Hudson rule to ver-
bal statements made by the defendant following the execution of a
search warrant in violation of the knock-and-announce rule.112
Certain lower courts have been unreceptive to the argument in
Hudson that alternative factors such as police discipline and civil suits
can effectively replace the exclusionary rule as a successful deterrent
to police misconduct in the search-and-seizure area.113 For example,
the Third Circuit held that the exclusionary rule should remain the
remedy for evidence seized by police during an illegal traffic stop be-
cause alternative factors such as improved police education, training,
and discipline have not necessarily been successful in deterring police
search-and-seizure misconduct.114 In addition, one district court has
found that the exclusionary rule should remain the chief mechanism
for preventing Fourth Amendment warrant violations by police be-
cause exclusion leads police to adopt better training, supervision, and
review procedures.115
Other lower courts, however, have been more willing to consider
the argument in Hudson that alternative factors can replace exclusion
as a remedy for police violations in the Fourth Amendment search-
and-seizure area. Specifically, certain federal courts agree with Hudson
that civil lawsuits can adequately deter Fourth Amendment search-
and-seizure violations.116
D. Literature Review: Empirical Studies Regarding the
Exclusionary Rule
This section explains other significant scholarly studies on the ex-
clusionary rule since the rule’s adoption in the 1960s. In various
110. See United States v. Smith, 526 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2008).
111. See In re Frank S., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 320 (Ct. App. 2006).
112. See United States v. Kearns, No. 1:05-CR-146-WSD, 2006 WL 2668535 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 15, 2006).
113. See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Ryan, No.
2:07-CR-35, 2008 WL 901538 (D. Vt. Mar. 31, 2008).
114. See Mosley, 454 F.3d at 268–69.
115. Ryan, 2008 WL 901538, at *5.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009)
(regarding an illegal seizure of identifying information); United States v. Qing Li, No. 07-
CR-2915-JM, 2008 WL 789899, at *5 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008) (regarding an illegal
seizure of electronic information); United States v. Wellman, No. 1:08-CR-00043, 2009 WL
37184, at *7 n.8 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 7, 2009) (regarding a Fourth Amendment violation).
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Fourth Amendment contexts, these studies have all attempted to ex-
amine empirically the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule using
social scientific techniques.
One of the early, foundational studies on the value of the exclu-
sionary rule is the 1970 study by Dallin Oaks.117 Oaks analyzed arrest
and conviction numbers in Cincinnati, Ohio, for weapons and narcot-
ics offenses, both prior and subsequent to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Mapp.118 Oaks found that the Mapp decision’s exclusionary
rule had no significant deterrent effect on police misconduct during
searches related to these offenses in Cincinnati.119 In particular, the
study showed that the rule had no measureable effect on the number
of overall arrests and convictions by Cincinnati police for these of-
117. See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 681–89 (1970). Before Oaks’s study, there were several studies concerning the
exclusionary rule in the period immediately following the 1961 Supreme Court case of
Mapp v. Ohio in which the Court first applied the exclusionary rule to state courts for
evidence discovered during illegal police searches. See id. at 678–709 (discussing previously
published research on the effect of the exclusionary rule).
In 1963, Stuart Nagel surveyed police chiefs, prosecutors, judges, defense attor-
neys, and ACLU officers in forty-seven states. The overwhelming majority agreed
that the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence reduced illegal searches. Mapp
had been decided in 1961, and Nagel asked whether police compliance with the
Fourth Amendment had increased or decreased between 1960 and 1963. Seventy-
five percent of the respondents in states without an exclusionary rule prior to
Mapp said that compliance had increased, but only 57% of the respondents in the
states that had an exclusionary rule prior to Mapp said so. Similarly, Michael Katz
reported that 64% of the prosecutors, 62% of the defense attorneys, and 78% of
the judges surveyed in North Carolina agreed that the “[e]xclusion of evidence is
an effective way of reducing the number of illegal searches.”
Albert Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365,
1373 (2008) (citations omitted). When Katz inquired if “[c]ivil and criminal proceedings
against law enforcement officers should be the sole means of enforcing the requirements
of legal search,” 15% of the prosecutors agreed while only 5% of defense lawyers and 3%
of the judges did so. Michael Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry Into Mapp v.
Ohio in North Carolina. The Model, the Study and the Implications, 45 N.C. L. REV. 119, 134
(1966). Lastly, in the 1960s, Columbia University law students studied arrest information
for minor drug crimes in New York City criminal courts immediately before and after
Mapp. Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases,
4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87, 87 (1968). Among specialized drug officers in New York
City, arrests for minor drug offenses subsequent to Mapp fell by over 50%. Id. at 92. The
authors noted that more than half of the arrests for these offenses prior to Mapp resulted
from unconstitutional searches under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
118. In addition, Oaks found a drop in the number of gambling convictions. Oaks,
supra, note 117, at 690–91. However, since police gambling raids fell initially in 1959—two R
years prior to Mapp—Oaks did not believe the decrease was due to any deterrence effects
from Mapp, or from the exclusionary rule. Id.
119. Id.
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fenses.120 Oaks had posited that if the exclusionary rule was exerting
an effect on police behavior, both arrest and conviction numbers
might reveal this effect.121 Moreover, regarding stolen property, Oaks
hypothesized that since police had reported that they violate search-
and-seizure laws to retrieve stolen property, the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule related to this type of violation could be shown if
police were recovering less stolen property in the aftermath of
Mapp.122 However, Oaks found no immediate decrease in the amount
of stolen property recovered by Cincinnati police following Mapp.123
In another preliminary study on the exclusionary rule in the
1970s, James Spiotto examined changes in the number of motions to
suppress evidence filed between 1950 and 1971 in Chicago criminal
courts involving narcotics, gambling, and weapons crimes.124 Spiotto
hypothesized that a decline in the number of motions filed would sug-
gest that the exclusionary rule was functioning as an adequate deter-
rent of unconstitutional police searches.125 Spiotto found that while
the percentage of winning motions to suppress fell during this period
in gambling cases, it rose significantly in weapons and narcotics
cases.126 Spiotto concluded that the increase in the number of these
motions in narcotics cases had two primary sources: (1) Chicago
judges’ efforts to deal with their rapidly-rising narcotics caseloads by
granting more motions to suppress in these particular cases;127 and
(2) the wider reliance on these motions as a flexible, discretionary
tool for granting leniency for minor offenses, including certain drug
crimes.128 Regarding his findings for the gambling cases, Spiotto pos-
ited that the decline in motions was due to the fact that most of the
gambling cases were not being handled by Chicago police and courts
but instead were being addressed by federal law enforcement and
120. Id.
121. Id. at 689.
122. Id. at 692.
123. Id. at 692–93. Oaks did point out that there was a “gradual decrease” in the
amount of stolen property recovered in the years following Mapp, and this decrease “may
reflect a long range [sic] effect of the Mapp decision, with decreased recoveries of stolen
property as police officers begin to accept and conform to the search and seizure [sic]
requirements.” Id. at 693. However, “[t]his evidence by itself is inconclusive.” Id.
124. James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and
Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 246–48, 252 (1973).
125. Id. at 248.
126. Id. at 246.
127. See id. at 252 (explaining that granting preliminary motions to suppress serves a
screening function).
128. Id. at 248 n.24. For additional discussion of the increasing narcotics caseloads in
Chicago during this period, see Oaks, supra note 117, at 685. R
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courts.129 In conclusion, Spiotto’s research did not necessarily show
that the exclusionary rule was a successful deterrent to unconstitu-
tional police behavior.130
Bradley Canon led a major study on the exclusionary rule, and he
expanded the Oaks Cincinnati study to fourteen other United States
cities.131 Canon’s study found that Oaks’s conclusions regarding the
exclusionary rule in Cincinnati were not necessarily typical. Specifi-
cally, in certain other cities the amount of arrests had significantly
declined since Mapp; this is in direct contrast to Oaks’s finding that
there was no measureable change in the number of arrests in Cincin-
nati.132 This decrease may indicate that the exclusionary rule was hav-
ing a deterrent effect on police searches and arrests outside
Cincinnati (i.e., the number of illegal searches revealing evidence for
illegal arrests was declining).133
Furthermore, Canon surveyed prosecutors and police administra-
tors regarding their beliefs on the number of search warrants applied
for by police as well as the number of motions to suppress awarded by
judges subsequent to Mapp.134 Canon discovered that prosecutors and
police officials believed there had been a significant increase in the
number of search warrant applications; however, the number of
awarded motions to suppress was reported as relatively low following
Mapp.135 In addition, these officials believed that in the aftermath of
Mapp, police policies restricted the carrying out of searches incident
to arrest.136
In sum, Canon concluded that his findings may support the no-
tion that the exclusionary rule was deterring police misconduct re-
129. Spiotto, supra note 124, at 246–48. R
130. Id. at 276–77.
131. Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a
Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 703 (1973).
132. Id. at 704.
133. See id. at 704, 706–07. Like Oaks, Canon examined the amount of police arrests
for narcotics, gambling, weapons, and stolen property crimes, focusing on the arrest rates
in fourteen cities prior and subsequent to Mapp. Id. at 703–04. Canon noted a substantial
decline in the amount of arrests in Baltimore subsequent to Mapp. Id. at 704–05.
134. Id. at 711, 721.
135. See id. at 714, 721. Regarding the low number of awarded motions to suppress,
Canon pointed out that this may indicate the exclusionary rule’s effectiveness. Id. at 718. In
other words, the finding suggests that police are abiding by constitutional norms, includ-
ing those related to the Fourth Amendment. See id. Finally, Canon believed that the in-
crease in search warrant applications may also reflect the fact that more officers are
following constitutional norms since the application of the exclusionary rule after Mapp.
Id. at 715–16.
136. Id. at 715–17, 719.
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lated to arrests and searches: “[O]ur argument is negative rather than
positive; . . . the evidence from the 14 cities certainly does not support
a conclusion that the exclusionary rule had no impact upon arrests in
search-and-seizure type crimes in the years following its
imposition.”137
A significant issue left unresolved by Canon’s study, however, was
the determination of the influence, if any, that the adoption of the
exclusionary rule by the Supreme Court in Mapp had on his find-
ings.138 Another point involved the low response rate for Canon’s
questionnaire, which may have adversely impacted his findings.139
In a police study regarding the exclusionary rule, Myron Orfield
interviewed twenty-six Chicago narcotics officers, including police of-
ficers and detectives, through a survey questionnaire.140 Orfield dis-
covered that: (1) when courts exclude evidence, police officers
understand why; (2) this understanding led the officers “to use war-
rants more often and to exercise more care when conducting warrant-
less searches;”141 (3) the exclusion of evidence, and particular
measures taken by police officials as a result of this exclusion, “pun-
ish” the officers for their misbehavior during searches;142 (4) officers
137. Id. at 707.
138. Id. at 714, 728 (noting that Mapp was one of many decisions of the Warren Court
that could affect the behavior of law enforcement agencies).
139. For an explanation of several of the problems concerning Canon’s sample, see
Steven R. Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That It Is a Deterrent to
Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404, 406–08 (1979) (cited in Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deter-
rence, supra note 11, at 1021 n.27). Canon did a follow-up study in 1977 in which he com- R
pared arrest rates for gambling, narcotics, and weapons offenses prior and subsequent to
Mapp in states that possessed an exclusionary rule at the time of Mapp (“own rule” states)
with states that adopted the exclusionary rule after or because of Mapp (“imposed rule”
states). Perrin, supra note 12, at 701 (citing Bradley C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil R
Liberties Policies at the State and Federal Levels, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977)). Canon’s findings
were as follows:
Based on the relative increases or decreases in the arrest rates after Mapp, Canon
concluded that Mapp had a significant impact on 34.8% of the “imposed rule
states” and no significant impact on the remaining 65.2% of those states. In com-
parison, Canon found that Mapp significantly impacted arrest rates in 43.5% of
the “own rule” states, but not the remaining 56.5% of the “own rule” states. This
surprising finding, which at first blush appears to be upside down, led Canon to
speculate that the only way Mapp has a strong impact is if it reinforces an already
existing exclusionary rule policy.
Id.
140. See Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1017–18, R
1024–30, 1053–54.
141. Id. at 1017–18.
142. Id. at 1046–48. Punishment included transfers to less favorable positions, demo-
tions, and elimination of opportunities for promotion. Id.
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generally believed that the exclusionary rule should be retained but
that an exception should be created for police mistakes committed in
good faith;143 (5) officers generally perceived the rule in a positive
light and thought that an alternative remedy such as a civil lawsuit
“would ‘overdeter’ the police in [conducting] their search and seizure
[sic] activities;”144 and (6) police officials and prosecutors responded
to the exclusion of evidence by initiating programs and policies to
ensure greater police compliance with search-and-seizure norms.145 In
conclusion, officers in Orfield’s Chicago study perceived that the ex-
clusionary rule had significant deterrent effects.146
In a 1992 courts study on the exclusionary rule, Myron Orfield
interviewed judges, public defenders, and prosecutors (the “subjects”)
from fourteen felony trial courtrooms in Cook County, Illinois, using
a questionnaire.147 Orfield discovered that the subjects believed police
officers “experience adverse personal reactions” and “change their be-
havior” in response to the suppression of evidence in their cases.148 In
addition, the subjects agreed that the exclusionary rule is effective in
instructing officers on the legal rules dealing with searches, and that
these rules do not prevent officers from fulfilling their responsibili-
ties.149 According to Orfield’s study, the deterrent impact of the rule
is enhanced when officers are tasked with “big or important cases” or
when they are employed in specialized law enforcement units.150
Moreover, “the Court’s [subjects] outlined a pattern of pervasive
police perjury intended to avoid the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment,” including the exclusionary remedy.151 The study indi-
cated that judges knowingly permit this perjury to continue.152 De-
spite the perjury issue, however, the subjects perceived that the
exclusionary rule promotes “police professionalism” and adherence to
search-and-seizure norms.153 In general, the subjects agreed with re-
taining the rule, which they perceived to be a more effective remedy
143. Id. at 1051.
144. Id. at 1018.
145. Id. at 1027–29. Such programs and policies include increased training of officers
in the field of search-and-seizure law, better record keeping of successful motions to ex-
clude, and internal review of cases involving these motions. Id.
146. Id. at 1017.
147. See Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor, supra note 11, at 81–84. R
148. Id. at 80, 82.
149. Id. at 82.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 82–83.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 83.
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for police misconduct in the search-and-seizure area than civil lawsuits
(e.g., against police).154
Near the time of Orfield’s studies, other researchers examined
police compliance with Fourth Amendment law to gain additional in-
sight into the exclusionary rule’s potential to deter misconduct. For
example, Heffernan and Lovely surveyed police officers regarding
their knowledge and perceptions of Fourth Amendment law, as well as
to better assess officer perceptions concerning compliance with this
law.155 They discovered that unintentional mistakes were committed
by nearly one-third of the officers surveyed in decisions dealing with
search-and-seizure law.156 Moreover, 15% of the officers intentionally
committed at least one mistake.157
Another survey by Akers and Lanza-Kaduce of over two hundred
police officers from two southeastern cities found that 19% admitted
to conducting searches of “questionable constitutionality” at least
once a month, and 4% of the officers stated that they conducted
searches they knew to be illegal at least once a month.158
More recently, in 1998, Perrin, Caldwell, Chase and Fagan sur-
veyed 1144 officers in Ventura County, California.159 Perrin discov-
ered that 19.7% of the officers who responded that the exclusionary
rule affected their behavior on the job were “primarily concerned”
with the risk of exclusion of evidence while 59.3% perceived exclusion
as an “important concern.”160 However, over 18.7% of the officers per-
ceived that the threat of exclusion was only a “minor concern” or “no
concern at all” when searching for evidence.161 In addition, almost
154. Id. Professor Kenworthey Bilz recently examined the effect of the exclusionary
rule in court by designing a study consisting of participants who were presented with vari-
ous situations requiring the application of the exclusionary rule. Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty
Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 149, 149 (2012). Bilz discovered that the participants were selective about applying
the exclusionary rule when the law required it. Id. For example, the participants were more
likely to exclude evidence obtained as a result of racial profiling rather than as a result of
more innocent errors. Id. at 158.
155. William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclu-
sionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance With the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311,
311–12 (1991).
156. See id. at 348.
157. Id.
158. See Ronald L. Akers & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Exclusionary Rule: Legal Doctrine and
Social Research on Constitutional Norms, 2 SAM HOUSTON ST. U. CRIM. JUST. CENT. RES. BULL.
1, 3–4 (1986).
159. Perrin, supra note 12, at 713. R
160. Id. at 721.
161. Id.
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60% of the officers stated that evidence they seized was never sup-
pressed from court, and almost half of the remaining officers indi-
cated having evidence suppressed on only one occasion.162 Officers in
the survey answered questions addressing search-and-seizure law cor-
rectly 50% of the time.163
Perrin questioned officers regarding their preference for the ex-
clusionary rule compared to other alternative deterrent mechanisms
and found that 57% of officers perceived that exclusion served best
the interests of the criminal justice system.164 Over 36% of the officers
perceived that increased officer education could serve as an effective
alternative deterrent remedy to exclusion.165 Approximately 20% of
the officers agreed with applying internal police discipline as an alter-
native deterrent for officer misconduct.166 Only about 1% of the of-
ficers indicated support for the alternative deterrent of criminal
prosecution, including prison time.167 Perrin concluded that the ex-
clusionary rule is not successful in deterring police misconduct, in
part because officers fail to comprehend the rule as a result of unsatis-
factory knowledge, education, and training about the rule’s operation
and implications.168
Professors Totten and Cobkit found that chiefs in large United
States cities perceive that training, education, and internal discipline
have a greater deterrent impact on police misconduct related to
knock-and-announce procedures during searches than do exclusion of
evidence and community oversight.169 The majority of chiefs, how-
ever, perceive that the exclusion of evidence is “helpful” in deterring
162. Id. at 722.
163. Id. at 735. Studies conducted prior to Perrin’s have also shown that police knowl-
edge and training regarding search and seizure law is rather poor. See, e.g., Eugene Michael
Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A Police Officer’s Perspective, 10 PAC.
L.J. 33, 47 (1979) (“[T]he average officer did not know or understand proper search and
seizure rules and . . . supervisors or senior officers only achieved slightly improved
scores.”); Stephen L. Wasby, Police Training About Criminal Procedure: Infrequent and Inade-
quate, 7 POL’Y STUD. J. 461, 464, 466 (1978) (“Recruit training is sadly lacking in criminal
procedure content” and “[t]he spirit and tone of communication about the law, particu-
larly when the law is favorable to defendants’ rights, is often negative, with the need for
compliance stressed only infrequently.”).
164. Perrin, supra note 12, at 732. R
165. Id. at 732–33.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 734–36.
169. Christopher D. Totten & Sutham Cobkit (Cheurprakobkit), The Knock-and-An-
nounce Rule and Police Searches After Hudson v. Michigan: Can Alternative Deterrents Effectively
Replace Exclusion for Rule Violations?, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 414, 419, 441–43 (2012).
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police misconduct related to these procedures.170 In addition, police
chiefs are knowledgeable regarding the application of the knock-and-
announce rule during searches and of the Hudson decision in gen-
eral.171 Finally, most chiefs report that their departments do not have
disciplinary policies on officer knock-and-announce misconduct.172
Raymond Atkins and Paul Rubin, utilizing two panel data sets and
advanced statistical methods from economics, determined that crime
rates may have risen in the United States, specifically in suburban cit-
ies, in the wake of Mapp.173 In particular, Mapp may have led to an
increase in crime rates without causing a significant number of case
dismissals.174 Atkins and Rubin determined that Mapp may have led to
a 3.9% rise in larceny crimes, 4.4% in auto thefts, 6.3% in burglaries,
7.7% in robberies, and 18% in assaults.175 In addition, in suburban
cities, Mapp may have caused a 27% increase in violent crimes and a
20% increase in property crimes.176 Atkins and Rubin concluded that
these rises in crime rates may occur because when the exclusionary
rule is present, police may decide to use alternative approaches to
crime solving that they perceive as less useful than searches.177
Mialon and Mialon arrived at similar conclusions by utilizing sta-
tistical methods and modeling from economics.178 They discovered
that the exclusionary rule not only causes a rise in crime but also has
two contradictory effects on searches.179 In particular, the rule directly
decreases the number of police searches by lowering the odds that
these searches result in successful convictions (i.e., police will not un-
dertake searches they know are likely to result in exclusion), but also
indirectly leads to more searches by police as a result of increasing
crime.180 If the indirect effect of the rule operates, the rule leads to an
increase in searches and has an ambiguous effect on unconstitutional
police searches.181 If the direct effect of the rule operates, it causes a
170. Id. at 448.
171. Id. at 446.
172. Id. at 449.
173. See Raymond Atkins & Paul Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates: Map-
ping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON. 157, 164, 174 (2003).
174. Id. at 164.
175. Id. at 174.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See Hugo Mialon & Sue Mialon, The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic
Analysis, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 22 (2008).
179. See id. at 39–40.
180. Id. at 22.
181. Id. at 39.
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decline in unconstitutional police searches, thereby promoting citizen
privacy.182 The direct effect applies more frequently when the number
of police officers per capita rises, when police incentive to close cases
declines, and the concern of police toward error in their own behav-
ior rises.183
Professor Jacobi also recently used a law and economics approach
(specifically, a game theory model), to show that the exclusionary rule
is generally ineffective at deterring illegal police searches, and that its
costs too often fall on innocent defendants by decreasing opportuni-
ties at trial to prove reasonable doubt.184 In particular, the exclusion-
ary rule prevents trials from distinguishing between factually innocent
and guilty defendants.185 Because of the drawbacks of the exclusion-
ary rule and judges’ attempts to avoid its application—which itself
“twist[s] and subvert[s] the secondary doctrines” of search-and-seizure
law—Jacobi proposes that future Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
be crafted so as to ensure clearer divisions between innocent and
guilty defendants.186
Finally, there have been recent efforts to evaluate the exclusion-
ary rule through field observation. In 2004, Gould and Mastrofski eval-
uated reports from experienced field observers who had joined
metropolitan police officers on more than one hundred searches.187
One-third of these searches violated search-and-seizure laws.188 In ad-
dition, Jerome Skolnick’s field observations found that the exclusion-
ary rule led police to falsify arrest reports and generally not comply
with procedural rules.189 Skolnick concluded that there were particu-
lar aspects of the police work culture that prevented the exclusionary
rule from being a successful deterrent to illegal police activity.190
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 585, 587, 589 (2011).
185. Id. at 587–92.
186. Id. at 592.
187. Jon B. Gould & Stephan D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 325–26 (2004).
188. Id. at 316. The vast majority of unconstitutional searches were of suspects who
were not later arrested, which may show that the exclusionary rule deters arrests more than
it does unconstitutional searches. Id. at 332, 347.
189. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 209 (Macmillan College Publishing Co., Inc. 3d ed. 1994) (1966).
190. See id. at 221–23.
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II. Methodology
In this Part, the characteristics and demographics of the survey
samples, who are police chiefs, are discussed first followed by an ex-
planation of the relevant survey questions posed to the chiefs.
A. Samples
The samples of the survey study included police chiefs from 250
large cities with a population of at least 100,000, whose names and
addresses were obtained from the 2010 National Directory of Law En-
forcement Administrators. These large cities were chosen because po-
lice officers in large cities, in comparison to those in smaller cities,
confront more criminal suspects and handle more crime problems
and crime-related activities, including police seizures or arrests. In
May of 2010, a postcard announcement regarding the study was
mailed to each chief, and the cover letters and the survey question-
naires with a return, self-addressed stamped envelope were mailed a
week later. There were two additional follow-up surveys mailed to the
chiefs in July of 2010. The survey achieved a response rate of 53.2%,
with one hundred and thirty-three usable surveys returned.191
One hundred and eighteen respondents (94.4%) were males,
and seven (5.6%) were females. The large majority, ninety-seven re-
spondents, were White (77.6%), followed by eighteen African-Ameri-
can (14.4%), six Hispanic (4.8%), and four other (3.2%). Sixty-two of
the respondents were fifty years old or younger (approximately 50%),
fifty-six were between fifty-one and sixty years old (45%), and seven
were sixty-one years old or older (5%).
Fifty-nine respondents (48%) earned a master’s degree or above,
and fifty-four (44%) indicated they obtained a bachelor’s degree.
Concerning the length of service in law enforcement, only seven-
teen respondents had been in service fewer than twenty years, while
the remaining 108 (86%) had been in service for longer than twenty
years. One hundred and three of the respondents (96.1%, the large
majority) reported that during their police career they made an arrest
while applying the knock-and-announce rule. On average, the respon-
dents’ departments conducted 2581 arrests annually.
191. Of the 133 surveys received, forty-one surveys noted that they were completed by
the chief’s designee, who is generally a ranking officer (e.g., captain, lieutenant, sergeant,
etc.).
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B. Survey Instrument
The study’s data is derived from a detailed survey distributed in
2010 regarding police policies and practices implicating the knock-
and-announce rule. The researchers designed fourteen questions to
measure police chiefs’ perceptions concerning knock-and-announce
activity, including: (1) police knowledge regarding the knock-and-an-
nounce rule in the arrest context; (2) training support on the knock-
and-announce rule in the arrest context; and (3) deterrent factors
dealing with the knock-and-announce violation. The researchers pre-
tested the survey questionnaire with five potential samples (police
chiefs and police administrators) for their input and revised the ques-
tionnaire accordingly.
The “police knowledge” category examined whether survey re-
spondents were knowledgeable regarding the knock-and-announce
rule in the arrest context. The respondents were questioned about
whether: (1) assuming no emergency, the police should wait a reason-
able amount of time before entering a home or a building to make an
arrest; and (2) it is acceptable for the police to enter a home to make
an arrest after knocking and announcing their presence and authority
and waiting less than fifteen seconds.
The “training support” category measured the amount of training
support officers receive pertaining to arrests implicating the knock-
and-announce rule by asking the respondents whether they believed
police officers receive sufficient training on how to make an arrest
applying the knock-and-announce rule. The scale was one to five, with
one being “strongly disagree” and five being “strongly agree.”
The “deterrent factors” category evaluated the degree to which
the respondents perceived various deterrent factors for police knock-
and-announce misconduct, including misconduct during arrests at
premises, as “helpful.” The survey questioned the respondents about
whether they thought the following factors could assist in deterring
police misconduct related to the knock-and-announce rule: (1) im-
proved police training; (2) greater numbers of better-educated police
officers; (3) the actual use and application of internal police discipli-
nary measures; (4) the presence of internal disciplinary measures; (5)
suppression of evidence in court subsequent to a police violation of
the knock-and-announce rule; and (6) community oversight (e.g., citi-
zen review board). Each factor received a rating on a four-point scale
where “1” indicated the respondent believed the factor “helped very
little,” and “4” indicated the respondent thought the factor “helped
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the most.” Analysis showed low reliability coefficients (alpha) for each
category; thus, each item was evaluated individually.192
Finally, the respondents were asked to describe the acceptable
amount of time that the police should wait after knocking and an-
nouncing before entering a home or building to make an arrest.
III. Findings and Conclusions
A. Study’s Findings
Table 1, infra, displays the data on chiefs’ knowledge concerning
knock-and-announce activity as well as training practices related to
this activity in the arrest context. According to the data in Table 1, a
large majority, 107 of respondents (82.3%), either agreed or strongly
agreed that under normal circumstances, after knocking and an-
nouncing their presence and authority, police must wait a reasonable
amount of time prior to entering a home or other building to make
an arrest. However, when questioned if that reasonable amount of
waiting time could be fewer than fifteen seconds, fifty-one respon-
dents (38.9%) agreed with the statement. The data also showed that
eighty-five respondents (63.9%) either agreed or strongly agreed that
police officers received enough training on how to make an arrest,
including arrests involving the knock-and-announce rule.
Table 2, infra, shows the amount of time the respondents be-
lieved the police should wait after they knock and announce their
presence and authority at a home or building but before they enter
those premises to make an arrest. Based on the responses, it appears
that the large majority of police chiefs (96.9%) was knowledgeable
about the knock-and-announce rule. Thirty-four respondents (26%)
indicated that the waiting time in a normal knock-and-announce situa-
tion should be a minimum of fifteen seconds (which is the federal
common law standard established in Banks),193 while only twelve re-
spondents (9%) indicated that the waiting time should be fewer than
fifteen seconds. The other eighty-three respondents (65%) believed
that the amount of time the police should wait after knocking and
announcing but prior to entering premises to make an arrest hinged
upon the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. Ac-
cording to the respondents, the two principal contributing factors af-
192. Reliability coefficient is a measure of internal consistency that determines whether
a number of items make up an index designed to measure a single construct. BRIAN C.
CRONK, HOW TO USE SPSS 118 (7th ed. 2012).
193. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. R
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fecting the police decision were the size of the arrest location and the
degree of risk of evidence being destroyed.
Table 3, infra, reflects respondents’ perceptions concerning the
effect of certain deterrent factors on police misconduct related to the
knock-and-announce rule. Among the six deterrent factors, improved
police training was perceived by respondents to help the most in de-
terring police misconduct (mean = 3.68),194 followed by greater num-
bers of better educated police officers (mean = 3.27), followed by the
actual use and application of internal police disciplinary measures
(mean = 3.11). The presence of internal police disciplinary measures
(mean = 2.85) and the suppression of evidence in court following a
knock-and-announce rule violation (mean = 2.81) were the two factors
that reflected a similar but relatively weaker deterrent impact on illegal
police conduct. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents perceived
that these two factors “help the most” or “help somewhat” in prevent-
ing illegal police conduct related to the knock-and-announce rule
(e.g., 71.5% of respondents for the factor addressing the presence of
internal disciplinary measures and 64.6% of respondents for the fac-
tor addressing the suppression of evidence in court following a knock-
and-announce violation). Finally, the respondents perceived commu-
nity oversight (i.e., citizen review boards) as being the least effective of
the six deterrent factors (mean = 1.56). A mere 14.3% of respondents
perceived community oversight as “helping the most” or “helping
somewhat” in preventing illegal police misconduct related to the
knock-and-announce rule.
B. Study’s Conclusions
1. Chiefs’ Knowledge of the Knock-and-Announce Rule During
Arrests at Premises
Concerning chiefs’ knowledge of the knock-and-announce rule
and arrests, the majority has a general understanding of the operation
of the knock-and-announce rule in the arrest context. In particular,
82.3% of the chiefs understand the basic knock-and-announce rule;
that is, these chiefs comprehend that unless there is some exigency,
police officers must knock and announce their presence and author-
ity and then wait a reasonable amount of time prior to entering a
home or other building to conduct an arrest. Finally, regarding com-
prehension of the knock-and-announce rule, most chiefs appear to
understand the correct amount of wait time between knocking and
194. The arithmetic mean was used for the current study.
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announcing at premises, on the one hand, and entering those prem-
ises to affect an arrest, if refused admittance, on the other hand. For
example, 83 out of 129 (64.3%) of the chiefs acknowledged that the
correct amount of wait time depends on the facts of the particular
case involving the knock-and-announce rule during a home arrest
(i.e., whether there is an exigent circumstance such as impending de-
struction of evidence). Moreover, thirty-four chiefs (26.4%) stated
that the wait time under a normal, non-exigent circumstance should
be a minimum of fifteen seconds (which is the federal common law
standard established in Banks),195 while just twelve (9.3%) respon-
dents indicated that the wait time should be fewer than fifteen
seconds.
Compared to the previous, related empirical studies to date, the
superior knowledge exhibited by the police chiefs in the current study
about the knock-and-announce rule in the arrest context is in line
with the previous finding by Orfield (1987) that police officers under-
stand why evidence is excluded in their cases; that is, according to
Orfield, these police employees understand general Fourth Amend-
ment search-and-seizure norms.196 However, the superior knowledge
of the chiefs regarding the knock-and-announce rule in the arrest
context is not in accord with the findings by Perrin (1998) and Heffer-
nan and Lovely (1991) that officers have reduced knowledge of
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure norms.197 This difference in
knowledge may be because chiefs have undergone more training and
education than the average officer, and they have had more opportu-
nities to learn as a result of their longer career experience.
2. Chiefs’ Perceptions of Officer Training on the Knock-and-
Announce Rule During Arrests at Premises
Nearly two-thirds of the chiefs (63.9%) perceived that police of-
ficers receive enough training on how to conduct an arrest, including
arrests at premises implicating the knock-and-announce rule.198
195. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. R
196. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1017–18. R
197. See Perrin, supra note 12, at 724–25, 735 (noting that approximately 50% of law R
enforcement officers successfully answered written questions on Fourth Amendment
search and seizure law); Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 155, at 348 (noting that about one- R
third of surveyed officers committed unwitting errors in decisions related to Fourth
Amendment law); supra note 163 and accompanying text (citing several academic works R
explaining the deficiencies in police academy training of officers in Fourth Amendment
law and that law enforcement knowledge of this law is reduced).
198. See infra Table 1.
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Though Orfield in his police study found that police receive training
on search-and-seizure laws (in particular when evidence is excluded in
their cases),199 the current study’s findings indicate that this training
includes the specific area of application of the knock-and-announce
rule during police arrests. In addition, this study’s findings reflect a
relatively high degree of agreement among chiefs on the sufficiency
or adequacy of police training on the knock-and-announce rule dur-
ing arrests. Nonetheless, a little over one-third (36.1%) of the chiefs
in the current study are not sure or do not perceive that officers re-
ceive enough training in this area.200
3. Chiefs’ Perceptions of the Impact of the Deterrence Factors on
Police Knock-and-Announce Violations During Arrests at
Premises
Regarding police chiefs’ perceptions of the impact of the deter-
rent mechanisms on police misconduct during arrests at premises in
the knock-and-announce area, these perceptions reflect what the Hud-
son Justices believed to be effective deterrent mechanisms for police
misconduct in this area: training, education, and internal disci-
pline.201 Thus, most of the police chiefs perceive these three mecha-
nisms as having a significant impact in helping to deter police
misconduct during arrests in the knock-and-announce area (i.e., a ma-
jority of chiefs perceive each of these factors as “helping the most” or
“helping somewhat”). Moreover, chiefs’ perception of the helpfulness
of these three mechanisms is relatively stronger than the other deter-
rent mechanisms examined in the study, such as community oversight
and exclusion. However, police chiefs’ perception of the helpfulness
of community oversight in preventing misconduct during arrests in
the knock-and-announce area is relatively lower than all of the other
examined factors. Merely 14.3% of the chiefs perceive community
oversight as having any substantial impact in preventing police mis-
conduct during arrests in the knock-and-announce area. On a scale of
“1” to “4” (where “1” indicates “helps very little” and “4” indicates
“helps the most”), the mean score among police chiefs for the deter-
rence factor of community oversight (i.e., citizen review boards) for
knock-and-announce rule violations by police was 1.56. Thus, chief
perception on the mechanism of community oversight does not seem
199. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1027–29. R
200. See infra Table 1.
201. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–99 (2005).
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to reflect the belief by the Hudson Justices that this mechanism can
effectively prevent police knock-and-announce misconduct.
Perhaps most importantly, the study’s findings concerning police
chiefs’ perceptions of the impact of exclusion of evidence as a deter-
rent for police misconduct during arrests in the knock-and-announce
area may not reflect the Justices’ belief in Hudson that exclusion is no
longer an effective deterrent for knock-and-announce misconduct by
police.202 In particular, most police chiefs (64.6%) perceive the mech-
anism of exclusion of evidence as having a substantial impact (e.g.,
“help the most” or “help somewhat”) in preventing knock-and-an-
nounce violations during police arrests. Though exclusion is per-
ceived by chiefs as being a relatively stronger deterrent than
community oversight for knock-and-announce misconduct during ar-
rests, it is perceived as being relatively weaker as a deterrent mecha-
nism than training, education, and discipline (albeit not substantially
so).203
Regarding earlier related studies, the chiefs’ perception of the
deterrent mechanism of training, as well as the chiefs’ perception that
officers receive sufficient training on how to conduct a seizure or ar-
rest implicating knock-and-announce procedures, is in line with
Orfield’s finding that Chicago police departments have existing poli-
cies and programs to train officers in Fourth Amendment law.204
Moreover, Orfield’s finding that police officers perceive favorably the
deterrent value of exclusion is in line with the current study’s findings
that most police chiefs perceive exclusion as helping to prevent police
misconduct during arrests in the knock-and-announce context.205 In
addition, Orfield’s determination that narcotics officers and detec-
tives are effectively punished or disciplined for search-and-seizure mis-
conduct is in line with the current study’s finding that most chiefs
perceive discipline as a helpful deterrent for knock-and-announce
misconduct by police during arrests.206
The current study’s findings on chiefs’ perception of the value of
exclusion to prevent police misconduct during arrests at premises in
202. Id. at 599.
203. For example, the difference in mean score between “chief perception of exclu-
sion” as a deterrent and the “presence of internal discipline” measured as a deterrent is
0.04. See infra Table 3.
204. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1027–29. R
205. Id. at 1051. See also Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor, supra note 11, at R
83 (finding that prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges also favorably perceive the de-
terrent value of exclusion).
206. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, supra note 11, at 1046–48. R
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the knock-and-announce area do not agree with Perrin’s conclusion
on the effectiveness of exclusion in deterring police misconduct in
general.207 Perrin concluded that exclusion was not an effective deter-
rent mechanism because: (1) officers did not subsequently discover
from police personnel that evidence had been suppressed in their
cases; and (2) officers who had experienced the exclusion of evidence
in their own cases did not show greater knowledge, and hence learn-
ing, of search-and-seizure laws.208 However, Perrin’s study focused
mostly on police officers as opposed to chiefs.209 Chiefs may have su-
perior knowledge about the value of the exclusionary rule in their
departments. In addition, Perrin’s study was restricted in scope to one
geographical county or state as opposed to the more expansive, na-
tional coverage of the current study.210 Lastly, Perrin’s study concen-
trated on overall police misconduct as opposed to the particular area
of police arrests at premises and the knock-and-announce rule.211
Nonetheless, several of the Perrin findings arguably do align with
the current study. For example, most of the survey respondents in Per-
rin’s study indicated that “the interests of the criminal justice system
are well served by excluding unlawfully seized evidence.”212 Similarly,
in the present study, most of the chiefs perceived exclusion as a valua-
ble law enforcement mechanism to prevent police misconduct during
arrests at premises involving the application of the knock-and-an-
nounce rule.213 In addition, just as the chiefs in the present study per-
ceived education to be a useful deterrent for police misconduct
during arrests, a significant number of police officers in Perrin’s study
perceived that education could be an effective, alternative remedy for
search-and-seizure misconduct.214
207. Perrin, supra note 12, at 734–35. R
208. Id. at 734. Perrin recommended that officers be exposed to additional educational
and training opportunities in Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. Id. at 735.
209. Id. at 719.
210. Id. at 712–13.
211. Id. at 673.
212. Id. at 732. Specifically, 57% of those surveyed concurred with this statement. Id.
Moreover, Perrin found that most officers considered the potential exclusion of evidence
to be an important, but not the primary, concern. Id. at 721. However, 18% of the respon-
dents stated that suppression was only a minor concern, or no concern at all, in the search
and seizure situation. Id. Thus, the majority of the officers surveyed perceived exclusion to
be either an important or primary concern. Id.
213. See infra Table 3.
214. Perrin, supra note 12, at 732 (“[T]he most popular suggested alternative remedy R
was a requirement that officers attend educational courses on search and seizure or police
interrogation with more than one-third of the respondents choosing that option.”).
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Finally, the majority of officers in Perrin’s study did not perceive
that internal police discipline is a useful mechanism to prevent police
search-and-seizure misconduct.215 In the current study, most chiefs
perceived internal discipline as a helpful deterrent for officer knock-
and-announce misconduct during arrests at premises. This difference
may be because chiefs will most likely not be the individuals to receive
such discipline, and it may also be due to the increased experience
and knowledge of a chief with a longer police career.
IV. Analysis/Policy Implications
A. Judicial Implications
While overall this study’s results resonate with the decision in
Hudson that certain alternative, non-exclusion mechanisms (e.g., po-
lice training, education, and discipline) can effectively prevent police
misconduct in the particular search-and-seizure area of knock-and-an-
nounce, the study’s findings cast doubt on Hudson’s assessment of the
alternative mechanism of oversight by the community. Specifically,
Hudson noted that citizen review boards have the ability to prevent
police misbehavior in the knock-and-announce area;216 however, an
overwhelming majority (84%) of the police chiefs surveyed from large
United States cities perceived citizen review to be of very little help in
preventing knock-and-announce rule misbehavior by officers during
arrests at premises.217 Indeed, citizen review was perceived by chiefs as
having the lowest “helpfulness” value among all of the deterrence fac-
tors included in the study.218
The chiefs’ perception of the deterrent value of citizen review
calls perhaps most forcefully for a re-assessment by the Court of the
application of this mechanism to prevent knock-and-announce viola-
tions. In light of both the study’s findings concerning the chiefs’
knowledge of the knock-and-announce rule in the arrest context and
given the overall leadership role played by chiefs in law enforcement
agencies, the chiefs themselves are in a unique position to evaluate
how to deter violations of the rule by rank-and-file officers, including
the use of citizen review procedures. If the Court itself were to re-
assess the mechanisms for deterring knock-and-announce misconduct
by officers, it may be sound policy to consider the perceptions of po-
215. Id. (“About two out of ten officers were willing to entertain the possibility of im-
plementing internal police discipline as a consequence of misconduct.”).
216. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2005).
217. See infra Table 3.
218. See id.
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lice chiefs in this regard. Indeed, given this study’s findings, courts
may want to refrain from adopting community oversight as a mecha-
nism to deter police from committing knock-and-announce violations
(i.e., at least until there is additional empirical evidence showing this
mechanism to be an effective deterrent).
In addition, a majority (64.6%) of the police chiefs perceived that
the exclusion of evidence in court is helpful in preventing police mis-
conduct during arrests implicating the knock-and-announce rule.219
In Hudson, the majority eliminated exclusion as a deterrent for knock-
and-announce rule misconduct by police (and many lower courts have
continued this approach).220 Thus, based on the study’s findings, the
Supreme Court and lower courts may want to re-evaluate the role that
exclusion can serve in the deterrence of knock-and-announce viola-
tions by police. Indeed, it may be prudent for courts to consider re-
assessing exclusion as a deterrent mechanism because among all of
the various mechanisms in the study perceived by chiefs as useful
(e.g., training, education, discipline, and exclusion), courts have per-
haps the greatest capacity to fashion and mold the exclusionary rule
as they see fit.221 For example, though courts could attempt to set a
minimal standard for officer education and training concerning the
knock-and-announce rule, or set certain disciplinary sanctions for rule
violations, they would have to depend upon numerous and diverse
219. See id.
220. See supra notes 36, 107, and 108 and accompanying text. Recall that lower courts R
have applied the holding of Hudson to the specific context of a knock-and-announce viola-
tion by officers during an arrest on premises. United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 201
(1st Cir. 2006). Hudson involved such a violation by police while they searched a premise.
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588.
221. Additional remedies that the judiciary may have control over are civil rights law-
suits or torts lawsuits. However, scholars have consistently pointed out various deficiencies
in civil suits as a mechanism to deter police misconduct. See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—
Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 173, 180–183 (2006) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. Civil suits
by inmates grounded in Fourth Amendment police violations typically lead to small mone-
tary awards. Id. at 182. Since lawyers are permitted to recover only a portion of these
awards as fees, many lawyers will be hesitant to take on such suits. See id. at 181–82; Perrin,
supra note 12, at 740 (“[T]he monetary damages awarded [in civil rights lawsuits] for R
Fourth Amendment violations are usually quite small. The plaintiffs are seen as unworthy
victims by the fact finders, who recoil at awarding these unworthy victims any significant
monetary amount.”). Perrin also acknowledged that officers and law enforcement depart-
ments have numerous immunities against civil rights lawsuits, that these suits are costly to
pursue, and that though such a suit could theoretically be successful, the officer may lack
the means to pay any monetary award. See Perrin, supra note 12, at 739–40. Torts suits R
encounter similar problems. See id. at 737–39 (noting that these suits are costly, that police
possess various immunities, and that juries lack sympathy toward plaintiffs). Perrin instead
suggests a civil administrative remedy to supplant suppression of evidence for constitu-
tional misconduct by officers in specific contexts. See id. at 743–55.
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United States police agencies to carry out any such rulings. Further,
without the external check of exclusion, police may be unwilling to
impose internal discipline on their own, particularly discipline of a
more grave nature.222 As a result, courts may want to seriously con-
sider the re-adoption of the exclusionary rule as a useful deterrent for
knock-and-announce misconduct by police.
Moreover, regarding the mechanism of police training as a deter-
rent to police misbehavior in the knock-and-announce area, this
study’s findings indicate that less than two-thirds (63.9%) of police
chiefs perceive that officers receive sufficient training in arrests impli-
cating knock-and-announce procedures.223 This finding suggests that
the deterrent mechanism of training may also possess certain limita-
tions on its effectiveness. On the other hand, with the exclusion deter-
rent, because it is a judicially-created mechanism, courts can exert
more influence over its development.
Finally, this study’s findings may inform state courts considering
adoption of particular mechanisms for knock-and-announce viola-
tions by officers during arrests at premises. For example, state courts
are permitted to interpret state constitutions or statutes in ways that
provide rights and protections beyond those contained in the Consti-
tution as interpreted by the Supreme Court.224 This ability possessed
by state courts allows them to consider other mechanisms apart from
those adopted by the Supreme Court to deter police misconduct.225
222. See Leading Cases, supra note 221, at 182 (recognizing that the exclusionary rule R
may account for any noted increase in professionalism and discipline in police
departments).
223. See infra Table 1.
224. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983).
225. This ability—or authority—is sometimes referred to as “new federalism.” See Chris-
topher D. Totten, Commentary, New Federalism and Our Constitutional Rights in the Criminal
Context, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 515, 515 (2010). For example, state courts may rely upon “ade-
quate and independent” state law grounds in their decisions. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040–41.
Through this specific reliance, state courts are able to protect particular rights of their
(state) citizens to a larger degree than the protection provided federal citizens by the Su-
preme Court concerning those same rights. Id. at 1037–38. State court decisions made on
these grounds are immune from Supreme Court review. See id. at 1040–41. In fact, certain
state courts have been receptive to the notion of suppressing evidence in the wake of
knock-and-announce misconduct on the part of their state’s law enforcement officers. See,
e.g., Berumen v. State, 182 P.3d 635 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (refusing to apply Hudson
ruling to grave misconduct by officers related to the knock-and-announce rule as it appears
in Alaskan statutory law). In addition, New Jersey courts have suggested that evidence
seized by police following a knock-and-announce violation might be suppressed under
their state constitution. See State v. Rodriguez, 943 A.2d 901 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008); State v. Robinson, 944 A.2d 718, 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), overruled on
other grounds by 974 A.2d 1057 (N.J. 2009).
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Such mechanisms could include the exclusionary remedy for knock-
and-announce misconduct. In addition, this study’s results have impli-
cations outside the knock-and-announce violation context. For exam-
ple, since the alternative deterrent mechanisms could be applied by
courts to other Fourth Amendment violations by police (e.g., unau-
thorized consent or vehicle searches), courts re-assessing deterrent
options in their jurisdiction for these other violations may also draw
upon the study’s results regarding chiefs’ perceptions of the various
deterrent mechanisms.
B. Policy Implications for Law Enforcement
The study’s findings suggest the overall value and effect of in-
creasing police professionalism on practices by police implicating
search-and-seizure law, including the knock-and-announce rule. Ac-
cording to the study’s findings, chiefs are now generally knowledgea-
ble regarding the operation of the knock-and-announce rule during
arrests at premises, and officers receive enough training on how to
apply the knock-and-announce rule during arrests at premises.226
Concerning specific policy implications based on the study’s find-
ings, police administrators must increase and intensify the application
of the three internal factors (training, education, and actual use of
internal disciplinary actions) to help respond to officer knock-and-an-
nounce rule violations during arrests at premises. For example,
though chiefs perceive training as the most effective deterrent mecha-
nism for officer misconduct in the knock-and-announce area, less
than two-thirds (63.9%) of police chiefs think officers receive suffi-
cient training on the use of the knock-and-announce rule during ar-
rests at premises.227 Therefore, it will be beneficial for police
administrators to offer officers even more training in this area.
Concerning police education, police departments must not only
maintain incentives for officers to continue their education through
tuition reimbursement policies and flexible scheduling options, but
they must also foster open-door policies to permit officers to utilize
their practical knowledge to offer insight and suggestions to
management.
226. See infra Table 1.
227. See id.
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Conclusion
Police chiefs are generally knowledgeable about the Fourth
Amendment knock-and-announce rule in the context of arrests at
premises. In addition, most chiefs perceive that officers receive suffi-
cient training on the application of the knock-and-announce rule dur-
ing such arrests. A majority of chiefs perceive education, discipline,
training, and exclusion as being helpful in preventing officer knock-
and-announce violations during home arrests of criminal suspects.
However, most chiefs do not perceive community oversight (e.g., citi-
zen review boards) to be helpful in preventing these types of viola-
tions. Police administrators must take further measures to strengthen
the deterrent factors that chiefs perceive as “helpful,” including of-
ficer training on the operation of the knock-and-announce rule dur-
ing arrests at premises. In addition, in light of the current study,
courts may wish to re-examine the efficacy and value of exclusion and
community oversight as deterrent mechanisms for officer knock-and-
announce misconduct in the arrest context.
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Table 1. Respondents’ Knowledge and Police Training on Knock-
and-Announce During Arrests (N = 133)
Strongly Strongly
Agree or Disagree or
Question Agree Neutral Disagree Mean Score
Unless there is some 107 4 19 4.13
emergency, police must (82.3%) (3.1%) (14.6%)
knock and announce their
presence and authority,
and then wait a reasonable
amount of time, prior to
entering a home or
building to make an arrest.
Assuming no emergency 51 25 55 2.92
situation, it is acceptable (38.9%) (19.1%) (42.0%)
for the police to enter a
home or building to make
an arrest after knocking
and announcing their
presence and authority,
and waiting less than
fifteen seconds.
Police officers receive 85 29 19 3.56
enough training on how to (63.9%) (21.8%) (14.3%)
conduct an arrest at homes
or buildings, including use
of the knock-and-announce
rule.
Note: Scores ranged from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning strongly disagree and 5 meaning strongly
agree.
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Table 2. Respondents’ Comments on a Proper Amount of Time the
Police Should Wait before Entering a Home or Building to
Arrest
Amount of Time Frequency
It varies based on the situation and circumstance 83
Fifteen seconds or more:
15 seconds 9
20–30 seconds 8
15–20 seconds 6
15–30 seconds 2
30 seconds–1 minute 3
15 seconds–1.5 minutes 2
1 minute 2
1–2 minutes 2
Less than 15 seconds:
5 seconds 1
5–10 seconds 3
10–15 seconds 5
Police should not wait 3
Note: Numbers may not add up to 133 because some participants declined
to answer the question.
Table 3. Respondents’ Perceptions of Deterrent Factors Related to
a Knock-and-Announce Violation (N = 133)
Help the Help Help Help Very Mean
Deterrent Factor Most Somewhat Slightly Little Score
95 33 3 1Better police training 3.68(71.4%) (24.8%) (2.3%) (0.8%)
59 55 13 5Better educated officers 3.27(44.4%) (41.4%) (9.8%) (3.8%)
Actual use of internal disciplinary 50 55 21 7 3.11measures (37.6%) (41.4%) (15.8%) (5.3%)
Presence of internal 30 65 24 13 2.85disciplinary measures (22.6%) (48.9%) (18.0%) (9.8%)
37 49 21 20Exclusion of evidence 2.81(27.8%) (36.8%) (15.8%) (15.7%)
3 16 32 80Oversight by community 1.56(2.3%) (12.0%) (24.1%) (60.2%)
Note: Scores ranged from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating help very little and 4 indicating help the
most.
